Update: Addressing Illinois’ Pension Debt Crisis With Reamortization

Update: Addressing Illinois’ Pension Debt Crisis With Reamortization
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Illinois' five state pension systems face a debt crisis after years of intentional borrowing from state contributions. The crisis is compounded by a backloaded repayment plan that calls for unrealistic, unsustainable state contributions in future years, putting funding for crucial public services at risk. Because the crisis is about debt, rather than benefits being earned by current and future employees, attempts to solve the problem through benefit cuts have failed. CTBA proposes resolving the pension debt crisis by reamortizing our payment schedule, creating a sustainable, level-dollar plan that saves the state $45 billion and gets the pension systems 70 percent funded by 2045. The state of Illinois has foregone $22 billion in savings since CTBA originally proposed to reamortize the debt in 2018. To bridge the higher contributions called for in the first several years of the reamortization plan, CTBA suggests using bonds to ensure current services do not have to be cut.

Asset transfers to the state pension systems: Six questions to be answered

Asset transfers to the state pension systems: Six questions to be answered
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One idea that has been proposed by a number of observers to repay some of Illinois’ pension debt is an “asset transfer.” Under this proposal, the state (or the City of Chicago, which is also facing a large pension debt problem) would make a contribution to the pension systems in the form of a publicly owned property, such as a tollway or lottery, rather than in the form of cash.

Proponents point to a number of advantages from such a move. First, the value of the asset would be added to the pension systems’ balance sheets, immediately reducing the systems’ debt, or “unfunded liability.” Second, as in the case of a tollway or lottery, the asset might produce its own revenue stream, which would provide an ongoing source of funding for the pension systems into the future. Finally, because annual state contributions to the pension systems are driven largely by the need to repay pension debt, if the asset transfer significantly reduced the amount of that debt, it could also reduce the state’s annual contribution, freeing up revenue for other current services.

This Analysis briefly looks at two recent examples of large pension asset transfers in New Jersey and Queensland, Australia, representing two paradigms: A revenue-generating asset that creates a dedicated funding stream, versus a one-time windfall from privatization.

The Analysis then poses six important questions for any asset transfer in Illinios:

1. What assets can be transferred, and what restrictions woudl the state face in transferring them?

2. Will the asset include a revenue stream currently used for other purposes? If so, how will the state replace that revenue?

3. Will the transfer be an implicit promise to privatize the asset?

4. How will the asset transfer affect the state's overall pension contribution levels?

5. How would an asset transfer affect management of the asset itself?

6. How will the asset transfer affect the pension funds' anticipated investment returns, and how will that affect the size of current liabilities and the state's required contributions?

You can download this Analysis as a PDF below, or read it at the Budget Blog here.

Addressing Illinois’ Pension Debt Crisis With Reamortization

Addressing Illinois’ Pension Debt Crisis With Reamortization
Released

Illinois' five state pension systems face a debt crisis after years of intentional borrowing from state contributions. The crisis is compounded by a backloaded repayment plan that calls for unrealistic, unsustainable state contributions in future years, putting funding for crucial public services at risk. Because the crisis is about debt, rather than benefits being earned by current and future employees, attempts to solve the problem through benefit cuts have failed. CTBA proposes resolving the pension debt crisis by reamortizing our payment schedule, creating a sustainable, level-dollar plan that saves the state $67 billion and gets the pension systems 70 percent funded by 2045. To bridge the higher contributions called for in the first several years of the reamortization plan, CTBA suggests using bonds to ensure current services do not have to be cut.

Three Problems With Gov. Rauner’s FY2019 Pension And Retirement Proposals

Three Problems With Gov. Rauner’s FY2019 Pension And Retirement Proposals
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This week, Gov. Bruce Rauner gave his fiscal year (FY) 2019 budget address, revealing his revenue and expenditure proposals for the upcoming year. The governor’s proposal relies on $1.5 billion in cost reductions to balance the budget, including:

  • A shift of 25 percent of the “normal cost” of pension benefits from the state to local governments for employees covered by the Teachers’ Retirement System and State University Retirement System ($363 million), as well as a shift of 100 percent of the normal cost to the Chicago Teachers’ Pension Fund ($228 million); and
  • The elimination of healthcare support for retired teachers ($129 million).

In addition, Gov. Rauner suggested he would like the state legislature to implement a “consideration model” to reduce pension costs, a longstanding proposal that would allow state workers to trade off lower pension benefits for some other benefit. The governor’s budget suggests such a move would save $900 million in FY2019, though that is not part of his plan to balance the budget. Rather, it would allow the state to reduce the individual income tax from 4.95 percent to 4.7 percent.

Each of these proposals pose serious problems, however. This brief highlights three of them.

Pension Changes in the FY2018 Budget: Short-Term Savings and Long-Term Costs

Pension Changes in the FY2018 Budget: Short-Term Savings and Long-Term Costs
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The changes made to Illinois public pension systems in Public Act (PA) 100-0023 (introduced as Senate Bill 42), the Budget Implementation Act, or BIMP, passed on July 6, 2017, and include two primary elements. First, the BIMP creates a new Tier 3 level of benefits for public sector workers. Second, the BIMP permits the state to smooth out the fiscal impact of the actuarial reduction in the assumed rate of return generated by the state’s five pension systems.

While proponents of the changes suggest they will give the state immediate and long-term fiscal relief from growing pension costs, this analysis of the changes indicates that the hoped for fiscal relief may not materialize.

Tier 3 is a new hybrid defined benefit-defined contribution plan that all Tier 2 and new employees will be able to opt into. The FY2018 budget is predicated on Tier 3 saving $500 million for the state; however, analysis by the State University Retirement System suggests that this number will be lower, and will continue to be slight for the foreseeable future. Moreover, much of the savings result from cost-shifting to local units of government.

The five-year assumption smoothing will result in savings in FY2018 for the state. However, it essentially amounts to additional borrowing against pension liabilities, and therefore will increase long-term costs. The Teachers Retirement System estimates that for each dollar of up-front savings, there will be three dollars of long-term costs.

New Details Emerge on Illinois' "Tier 3" Pension Plan

New Details Emerge on Illinois' "Tier 3" Pension Plan
Released

Illinois' fiscal year 2018 budget introduced major changes to the state's public pension systems in an attempt to grapple with Illinois' roughly $130 billion in unfunded liabilities. One of the most important aspects of these changes was a new package of benefits. This new package, called "Tier 3," introduced a hybrid defined benefit-defined contribution plan in addition to the defined benefit plans of Tier 1 and Tier 2.

This month, the State Universities Retirement System (SURS) released the first long-term actuarial analysis of the effects of Tier 3 and other changes contained in the FY2018 budget.

CTBA has identified three major takeaways from SURS' analysis:

  • The "normal cost" of Tier 3's defined benefit plan-that is, the cost of funding the benefits earned by current employees in a given year-will be higher than many observers expected. As a result, public employers-in this case, public universities and colleges-will be required to make larger payments on behalf of their Tier 3 employees.
  • The larger normal cost also means that Tier 3 employees will pay the maximum 6.2 percent of their income towards the defined benefit portion of their retirement benefits. When added to the 4 percent of income they will pay towards the defined contribution portion of their retirement benefits, that means Tier 3 employees will pay 10.2 percent of their income in pension contributions-significantly more than the 8 percent current SURS workers pay.
  • Contrary to some reports, which concluded that because Tier 3 will not be implemented in FY2018 it will not be able to produce any savings in this fiscal year, SURS still projects $61 million FY2018 savings from Tier 3. Over the long run, however, the pension changes made in the FY2018 budget do not meaningfully reduce the state's projected pension payments.

You can read the full report here or by downloading the PDF below.

Governor Rauner’s Amendatory Veto of SB1 Has a Number of Negative Consequences for Schools Across Illinois

Governor Rauner’s Amendatory Veto of SB1 Has a Number of Negative Consequences for Schools Across Illinois
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While the Illinois Senate voted on Sunday to override the Governor's amendatory veto (AV) of SB1, the Evidence-Based Model for education funding reform, a new CTBA analysis has identified at least six aspects of the AV that would each threaten the ability of Illinois school districts to reach adequate funding to serve their students.

These deficiencies underscore the importance of passing SB1.

CTBA finds that Governor Rauner's AV would frustrate SB1's core purpose of creating an adequate and equitable education funding formula in a number of ways, including by weakening:

  • SB1's "hold harmless" provision;
  • SB1's protections against artificially inflated pressure on local resources through accounting of PTELL and TIF effects;
  • SB1's accounting for inflation and regional cost differences; and
  • SB1's accounting for pension cost shifts under Tier III.

The bottom line is that the provisions in the AV are fatally flawed. SB1 is the only path to an education funding formula that is based on the evidence of what works, identifies the needed funds, and equitably distributes those resources over time to school districts across Illinois.

How Much Are State Pension Payments Worth to Illinois School Districts?

How Much Are State Pension Payments Worth to Illinois School Districts?
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Every school district in Illinois except for the Chicago Public Schools has its teacher pension payments made by the state as a consolidated payment to the Teachers Retirement System. Because of this, it is difficult to determine how much money these pension payments are worth to individual districts. CTBA has created per-district estimates for both normal cost (the payment that covers benefits being earned by current employees) and legacy cost (the debt service payment to make up for previous years' underfunding). These estimates show that state TRS payments are worth an average of $1,880 per student in the Chicago suburbs, and $1,420 per student in downstate school districts.

Public Pensions: Frequently Asked Questions

Public Pensions: Frequently Asked Questions
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Ever want to know what the average pension is for a state employee? What’s a funding ratio, and what are the funding ratios for the different pension funds? How much did benefit increases cost the pension systems? How much did investment losses contribute to pension underfunding? What’s the biggest factor for underfunded public pensions in Illinois?

We’ve got answers to those questions and many more in this convenient document, "Public Pensions: Frequently Asked Questions."

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It Is All About Revenue: A Common Sense Solution for Illinois’ Fiscal Solvency

It Is All About Revenue: A Common Sense Solution for Illinois’ Fiscal Solvency
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This Report offers a solution to Illinois' longstanding fiscal shortcomings. There are a number of common sense, data-driven initiatives that will modernize the tax code—and still keep Illinois relatively low tax. As this Report details, the state can completely eliminate its structural deficit by re-amortizing its pension debt and making the following tax policy reforms:

  • Reform state income tax policy by:
    • Increasing the personal income tax rate from 3.75 percent to 4.75 percent or 5 percent;  
    • Including some retirement income in the personal income tax base;
    • Increasing the corporate income tax rate from 5.25 percent to 6 percent;
    • Eliminate those corporate tax expenditures which are not generating a public good;
  • Reform sales tax policy by expanding the base of sales tax to include most consumer services; and
  • Impose a tax on sugary sweetened beverages.